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After twelve years and four rounds of military base closures since
1988, there is substantial evidence that the Department of Defense
("DoD") did not overstate its early predictions of billions of dollars
in annual base savings.' Similarly, despite dire economic predictions
from affected communities, the vast majority of communities
surrounding closed bases have successfully rebounded from the
departure of a major DoD employer.2
Robert M. Howard is an environmental partner at the San
Diego office of Latham & Watkins. He received J.D. and M.B.A. degrees
from Duke University in 1989 and B.S.M.E. and B.S. degrees from Tufts
University in 1982. Mr. Howard was involved in the first "privatizations in
place" of military bases in 1995 and 1996 that took place at the former
Naval Ordnance Station, Louisville, KY and the Naval Air Warfare Center
in Indianapolis, IN. He has represented both local redevelopment
authorities and redevelopers in the closure and divestiture of military bases
and "government-owned contractor-operated" plants around the country.
1. DEP'T OF DEF., THE REP. OF THE DEP'T OF DEF. ON BASE
REALIGNMENT AND CLOSURE 1 (Apr. 1998) (statement from William
Cohen, Secretary, Dep't of Def.).
2. See Paul Taibl, Def Dep't Jobs in Transition, BUSINESS
EXECUTIVES FOR NAT'L SEC. SPECIAL REP. 11-12 (Feb. 1999).
2 FORDHAMENVIRONMENTAL LA WJOURNAL [VOL. XII
When the last of the four rounds of base closures is completed in
2001, DoD expects to have spent $23 billion in the closure and
cleanup process, and saved $37 billion in base-related costs, for a net
short-term savings of $14 billion.3 After 2001, DoD expects to enjoy
$5.7 billion in annual savings,4 having achieved a twenty percent
reduction in domestic bases from 1988 levels. ' In addition, two-
thirds of the sixty-two communities surrounding major base closures
have reduced unemployment rates to levels at or below the national
average.' The Base Realignment and Closure ("BRAC") process has
been so successful that during the last three years of his tenure
Defense Secretary William Cohen recommended at least two
additional rounds of closures, a move that Congress consistently
opposed.7 The Bush administration has proposed additional base
closures, and Senator John McCain has sponsored a bill for two
additional rounds of base closure in 2003 and 2005.8
The impressive BRAC record stands in stark contrast to DoD's
uneven performance in transferring its remaining inventory of less
than seventy-eight "government-owned and contractor-operated"
("GOCO") plants.9 To be clear, GOCOs are not "military
installations" as defined by federal law and are not subject to the
BRAC process or federal transition assistance. GOCO plants are
unique creatures of statute that historically operated either rent-free
3. NAT'L SECURITY AND INT'L AFF. DIV., U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF.
("GAO"), MILITARY BASES: STATUS OF PRIOR BASE REALIGNMENT AND
CLOSURE ROUNDS 3 (Dec. 1998) [hereinafter 1998 GAO Report].
4. Id. at 3.
5. Id. at 2.
6. Id. at 3.
7. Nation in Brief: Cohen Urges More Base Closings, ATLANTA
J., Apr. 2, 1998, available at 1998 WL 3685798.
8. Otto Kreisher, The Bush Budget: More Bases Targeted as
Defense Waste, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Mar. 1, 2001, available at
2001 WL 6445701.
9. See NAT'L SEC. AND INT'L AFF. DIV., GAO,
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP: INCONSISTENT SHARING ARRANGEMENTS
MAY INCREASE DEFENSE COSTS 2-3 (July 1994) [hereinafter 1994 GAO
Report]. As of 1994, there were 78 GOCO facilities within the federal
inventory. The GOCO inventory included approximately 27 Army, 11 Air
Force, 19 Navy and 21 Defense Logistics Agency facilities. Id. at 3.
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or under favorable leases with various contractors supporting DoD's
industrial needs."0
Like the 451 military bases closed or realigned under the BRAC
laws in the last twelve years," the financial costs of maintaining
GOCO facilities outweighs their declining strategic value. This has
prompted DoD to declare that most GOCO plants are "excess" to its
needs and are suitable for transfer to non-federal ownership. The
strategic decline of GOCOs is related in part to the fact that most
contractors have moved to more modem privately owned facilities
where they enjoy greater flexibility in manufacturing products both
for DoD and for non-military commercial applications. 2
Because GOCO plants are typically aged and tainted with
significant environmental contamination from long-defunct
industrial practices, the commercial market for such plants is
extremely limited, thereby adding to the government's difficulty in
disposing of these properties. In response, DoD has attempted to
strongly encourage its current contractors to buy these outdated
facilities, with very limited success. For example, DoD has
occasionally threatened contractors with plant closures and
government cost recovery actions under the federal Superfund law,
notwithstanding the fact that (i) the government consistently
controlled and owned the GOCO facility and (ii) the current
contractor may be the eighth or ninth operator in a long lineage of
contractors to have operated the facility over the last fifty years.
Because the law supports their position, few contractors have
capitulated to the government's threats to buy an outdated facility,
and progress in divesting these facilities has slowed.
A better solution to DoD's problem of disposing contaminated
GOCO facilities is to model the disposal process after the successful
BRAC program. Capitalizing on the success of BRAC at larger DoD
installations, various communities with GOCO facilities have
successfully brokered a BRAC-style solution to the problem of
10. See 10 U.S.C. § 2667(a)(4) (1994) (allowing the Secretary of a
military department to lease department property upon such terms as he
considers will promote the national defense).
11. 1998 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 2.
12. See generally 48 C.F.R. § 45.302-6(e) (1999) (inserting clause
§ 52.245-10 into facility acquisition contracts); 48 C.F.R. § 52.245-
1 l(e)(1) (1999) (placing regulations and restrictions on facilities' uses,
such as limiting commercial production at GOCO plants to 25% of the
contractor's workload).
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disposing of GOCO facilities. The government, forfeits short-term
sales revenue from a potential plant sale, but reduces its long-term
carrying costs. As discussed herein, since 1995 at least nine GOCO
facilities have been transferred under special federal legislation at no
cost to local municipalities for purposes of promoting economic
redevelopment. 3 This falls short of the approximately thirty-five
economic development conveyances since 1993 of closed military
installations. 4 BRAC's proven track record of substantial federal
savings at DoD bases provides compelling justification for using a
similar approach to DoD's industrial plants.
Historically, the process .by which the government has divested
GOCO facilities has been inconsistent and cumbersome, in part
because the level of local municipal interest in obtaining these aging
and contaminated federal facilities has varied. Furthermore, the more
familiar BRAC laws adopted in the late 1980s and early 1990s do
not expressly govern GOCOs.15 However, with the increasing
number of BRAC success stories, the arguments in favor of a no-cost
GOCO facility conveyance have gained momentum over the last five
years with local municipalities. Moreover, Congress has been
receptive to authorizing a no-cost conveyance to interested
communities on a case-by-case basis. 6 In the process, local
communities and former GOCO contractors do not inherit the
government's environmental liabilities.
1. HISTORY OF GOCO FACILITIES
GOCO facilities are the product of World War II-era legislation.
Federal law does not consider these plants to be "military
13. See discussion infra Part V.B, Table B.
14. See K. Podagrosi, Economic Renewal: Community Reuse of
Former Military Bases, DefenseLINK 3 (Apr. 21, 1999) (former Rentoul,
IL mayor notes sixteen special transfers are pending), available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/reuse042199.html (last visited Apr. 5,
2001).
15. The Defense Authorization Amendments and Base Closure
and Realignment Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-526, 102 Stat. 2623 (1988)
completed the first round of BRAC closures. The last three rounds in 1991,
1993 and 1995 were government by the Defense Base Closure and
Realignment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510, 104 Stat. 1808 (codified as
amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1994) (governing the last three rounds of
BRA 1).
16. See discussion infra Part V.B.
2000] CLEANUP STANDARDS AT GOCO FACILITIES 5
installations." 7 GOCO facilities are federally owned industrial
reserve centers built mainly in the 1940s and 1950s to ensure rapid
and continuous weapons manufacturing capacity for DoD during
wartime. Given decades of heavy manufacturing activities at these
GOCO plants, the facilities invariably confront environmental issues
associated with long-defunct manufacturing practices. 8
GOCO facilities were originally operated pursuant to the authority
of the National Industrial Reserve Act of 1948."9 According to the
Act's legislative history, the industrial reserve program was designed
to overcome the problems of industrial demobilization after World
War I and the loss of readily available industrial wartime capacity,
which had to be rebuilt during World War II at much greater expense
and with significant time delay. During World War II, the
government was forced to build 1,200 industrial plants between 1940
and 1944 with an average construction time of 18 to 24 months.2
The industrial reserve legislation authorized DoD to retain a critical
mass of industrial capacity under federal ownership and control,
while at the same time offsetting the future maintenance costs
through rent-free "facility use" agreements with private industry.22
The superseding Defense Industrial Reserve Act of 197323
authorizes the Secretary of Defense to regularly review the inventory
of DoD industrial reserve facilities and retain or dispose of "excess"
17. See 10 U.S.C. § 2687(e) (1994). A military installation is
defined as a
base, camp, post, station, yard, center, homeport facility for
any ship, or other activity under the jurisdiction of the
Department of Defense, including any leased facility, which is
located within [the United States and its territories]. Such
term does not include any facility used primarily for civil
works, rivers and harbors projects, or flood control projects.
Id. BRAC also excludes facilities that do not have at least 300 "direct-hire,
permanent civilian employees of the Department of Defense." Id. §
2687(e)(2).
18. See Benjamin L. Ginsberg et al., Waging Peace: A Practical
Guide to Base Closures, 23 PUB. CONTRACT L.J. 169, 195 (1994).
19. National Industrial Reserve Act of 1948, Chs. 810, 811, 62
Stat. 1225 (1948).
20. RETENTION OF NATIONAL RESERVE OF INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTIVE CAPACITY, S. REP. No. 1409, at 3 (2d Sess. 1948).
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. 50 U.S.C. §§ 451-455 (1994).
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government-owned plants." Historically, the government preferred
to dispose of the excess industrial reserve properties through the
General Services Administration ("GSA"), subject to a recapture or
national security clause provision. 5 However, the government may
waive such an encumbrance to facilitate the disposal of the excess
federal property.26 Unless special legislation exempts a specific
GOCO facility from the traditional property disposal laws, GSA
controls the disposal process and is required to obtain "fair market
value."27
II. DoD's ENVIRONMENTAL LEGACY AT GOCO FACILITIES
As with the closure of military bases under the BRAC laws, DoD
has traditionally assumed the cost of environmental cleanup at both
its active and former industrial reserve plants. Only in extreme
circumstances, where a contractor engaged in reckless conduct or
violated then-relevant standard manufacturing practices or DoD
directives, would contractor liability potentially arise under standard
DoD "facility use" contracts.28
Within the next three to five years, DoD will continue to divest
and transfer to communities and non-federal owners its remaining
GOCO industrial reserve facilities. In the aftermath of harsh
criticism in 1997 from the General Accounting Office ("GAO") over
DoD's escalating cleanup costs at approximately seventy-eight
remaining GOCO facilities,29 DoD proposed, with almost no success,
that various government contractors voluntarily enter into "cost
sharing agreements" to help fund the cleanup of GOCO facilities.3"
24. 10 U.S.C. § 2535(b)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
25. See 32 C.F.R § 644.354(a) (1999).
26. See 41 C.F.R. § 101-47.306-2 (1999).
27. 41 C.F.R. § 101-47.305-1(a) (1999).
28. See discussion infra, Section IV.A.
29. NAT'L SECURITY AND INT'L AFF. DIV., GAO,
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AT DoD: BETTER COST-SHARING GUIDANCE
NEEDED AT GOVERNMENT-OWNED, CONTRACTOR-OPERATED SITES 2
(Mar. 1997) [hereinafter 1997 GAO Report]. DoD cost projections to
remediate GOCO facilities have increased steadily from $1.4 billion to
$3.6 billion.
30. See DEP'T OF THE NAVY, OPNAVINST 5090.1B, § 15-5.28,
ENVTL. AND NATURAL RESOURCES PROGRAM MANUAL (Nov. 1994)
("Absent special contractual provisions to the contrary, Navy policy shall
2000] CLEANUP STANDARDS AT GOCO FACILITIES 7
In 1996, GAO reported to Congress that potential transferees of
military bases uniformly rejected cost sharing with the government
to complete cleanup.3
Most GOCO contractors understand that as agents of the
government they are not responsible for environmental cleanup for
having operated DoD weapons plants under government supervision.
As discussed more fully herein, the government's environmental
liability at its current and former GOCO facilities is a function of
statute, government contracts, and court decisions. Unless the
government contractor or transferee of a GOCO facility voluntarily
agrees to assume certain liabilities for business or other purposes, a
growing body of authority will require DoD to remain solely
responsible for past and future cleanups at GOCO plants. The record
is reassuring for future owners or operators of a GOCO plant. To
date, no municipality or non-federal owner has been held liable to
complete the cleanup of releases attributable to former DoD
activities at any GOCO or BRAC facility.
If DoD contemplates enacting involuntary cost-sharing programs,
it would likely be an inadequate solution. Despite GAO pressure on
DoD to reduce the government's costs at GOCO facilities,
involuntary cost sharing is inconsistent with: (i) the applicable
standard facility use contracts in effect at the times of releases,
which relieve the GOCO contractors from incurring the costs of
environmental restoration and allow contractors to obtain
reimbursement for such costs; (ii) prior DoD funding practices at
other active and excess industrial reserve plants; (iii) federal
legislation under CERCLA32 and; (iv) well-settled court authority
imposing cleanup obligations under government contracts squarely
upon the government.33
At nearly all GOCO facilities, including the former Naval
Industrial Reserve Ordnance Plant ("NIROP") in Pomona,
California, the Calverton Naval Weapons Industrial Reserve Plant
("NWIRP") on Long Island, New York and the Fridley NIROP in
be to require GOCO contractors to pay for any and all cleanup costs
associated with their operation of Navy facilities.").
31. See NAT'L SECURITY AND INT'L AFF. DIv., GAO, MILITARY
BASE CLOSURES: REDUCING HIGH COSTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP
REQUIRES DIFFICULT CHOICES 19-20 (Sept. 1996) [hereinafter 1996 GAO
Report].
32. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 etseq. (1994).
33. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
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Minneapolis, Minnesota, DoD has remediated or is in the process of
restoring the facilities at full cost to the U.S. government. There is
no authority for the proposition that GOCO contractors or non-
federal transferees of an industrial reserve facility may be held
retroactively liable for the remediation of nearly sixty years of
defense-related activities. Where DoD has raised such an argument,
courts have consistently rejected it as an unfair attempt by DoD to
penalize GOCO contractors (and their successors) for the alleged
"sins" of national defense activities.
III. INCREMENTAL IMPROVEMENT IN TRANSFERRING CONTAMINATED
BRAC MILITARY INSTALLATIONS
In 1988, Congress designed a process to overcome (at least
temporarily) certain obstacles enacted earlier by the legislature to
halt base closures.34 In so doing, Congress also sought to immunize
the closure of economically important military installations from
local political pressure.35 In 1988, Secretary of Defense Frank
Carlucci convened an independent federal advisory commission to
recommend domestic bases for closure and realignment. The so-
called 1988 Base Closure Commission recommended the closure or
realignment of 145 installations,36 which led to a public outcry of
political retaliation. Congress not only proceeded to validate the
1988 Commission's recommendations, it took additional steps to
insulate the closure process in anticipation of even more base
closures in the future. Congress subsequently enacted the Defense
Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990, which was signed by
34. See Ginsberg, supra note 18, at 195. In 1977, Congress placed
severe restrictions on the executive branch's authority to divest itself of
military bases. In reaction to the planned closure of Loring Air Force Base
in Maine, Congress enacted legislation, formerly codified at 10 U.S.C. §
2687, to effectively prevent DoD from closing any major bases. The law
required the Secretary of Defense to provide Congress and the public with
prior notice of a base closure and a detailed justification. Congress then
had sixty days to halt the closure effort.
35. See Pub. L. No. 100-526, § 201(1), 102 Stat. 2623 (1988)
(codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1994 & Supp. 2000)) (granting
the secretary of defense the power to close all bases recommended for
closing by the Commission on Base Realignment and Closure).
36. See Natalie Hanlon, Military Base Closings: A Study of
Government by Commission, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 331, 337 (1991).
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President Bush on November 5, 1990."7 The 1990 BRAC legislation
formally established the Defense Base Closure and Realignment
Commission to complete the comprehensive review of the nation's
domestic military installations.38 The 1990 Act contemplated three
additional rounds of base closures in the non-election years of 1991,
1993, and 1995, and provided the procedures to accomplish this
unpopular task.39
The 1991 Commission recommended twenty-six major base
closures and nineteen realignments. The 1993 Commission
recommended twenty-eight major base closures and thirteen
realignments.4 °  The final round of 1995 Commission
recommendations impacted 146 domestic installations, including
thirty-three major base closures, twenty-six major realignments and
twenty-seven changes to prior base closure decisions.41 The 1995
recommendations were expected to begin no later than July 1997 and
were to be completed by July 2001.42 In 1995, DoD projected that
the net savings for the 1995 closures alone would amount to $18.4
billion over the next twenty years.43 The military installations
impacted by the four rounds of BRAC closures are, for the most part,
contaminated properties tainted with the same industrial legacy as
the roughly 500,000 non-DoD contaminated "brownfield" properties
nationwide.44
Complicating the straightforward transfer of contaminated federal
property are the stringent environmental requirements of section
120(h) of CERCLA, which requires that surplus federal property be
cleaned up before conveyance by deed to non-federal owners.45
37. Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2901 et seq., 104 Stat. 1485, 1808
(1990) (codified as amended at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1994)).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. DEP'T OF DEF., BASE CLOSURE AND REALIGNMENT REP.,
Table 1 (Major Base Closure and Realignment Recap) (Mar. 1995)
[hereinafter 1995 BRAC Commission Report].
41. Id. at 23-27.
42. See Pub. L. No. 101-510, § 2904(a)(3)-(4) (instructing that
closures shall commence within two years of the closure decision and be
completed six years later or by July 2001 for the 1995 closures).
43. 1995 BRAC Commission Report, supra note 40, at 3.
44. See E.G. Geltman, Recycling Land: Encouraging the
Redevelopment of Contaminated Property, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T 3
(Spring 1996) (suggesting that 500,000 brownfields exist nationwide).
45. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii)(I)-(II) (1994).
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Thus, although hundreds of bases had been designated for closure in
the early years of BRAC, conveyances to base redevelopers lagged
considerably because the environmental issues at the federal
installations were typically the most daunting to resolve in a timely
manner. Few environmental problems could be resolved within the
six years allowed by law to close a base. Prior to 1993, the BRAC
process was considered "broke."46
In 1992, Congress enacted the Community Environmental
Response Facilitation Act ("CERFA"),47 which amended CERCLA
in an effort to overcome the inherent delay in cleaning up a
contaminated federal facility before conveyance could take place. In
particular, Congress permitted federal installations to be "parcelized"
into contaminated and non-contaminated plots, allowing the non-
contaminated parcels to be conveyed more expeditiously.48 In July
1993, President Clinton also weighed-in with a five-part plan to
revitalize base closure communities.4 9 President Clinton's plan for
"Revitalizing Base Closure Communities" called for the following:
(1) Property disposition procedures that give higher priority to
economic redevelopment of the affected community through
expeditious disposal to "local redevelopment authorities";"
46. See K. Podagrosi, supra note 14, at 3 (reporting how the
former mayor of Rantoul, IL near Chanute Air Force Base notes Congress
and President took steps to improve BRAC around 1993).
47. Pub. L. No. 102-426, § 3, 106 Stat. 2174, 2175 (1992)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h) (1994)).
48. See id.
49. DEP'T OF DEF., DOD BASE REUSE IMPLEMENTATION
MANUAL § 1.3 (Dec. 1997).
50. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 2903(a), 107 Stat. 1547, 1927 (1993), corresponds
to section 2903 of Subtitle A of Title XXIX of the National Defense
Authorization Act of 1994, codified part of the President's plan by giving
DoD the authority to transfer at less than fair market value real or personal
property at a closing base to a "local redevelopment authority" established
by a State or local government (and recognized by the Secretary of
Defense) for purposes of "developing and implementing a plan for
managing" base redevelopment. DoD is further authorized to undertake an
"Economic Development Conveyance," whereby a closing base is
transferred for no consideration whatsoever if the facility is located in a
rural area or the Secretary finds that the closure will have a "substantial
adverse impact" on the local economy. DoD promulgated regulations to
determine eligibility for an Economic Development Conveyance at 32
C.F.R. § 175.7 (e)-(f) (1999). See also BASE CONVERSION AGENCY, AIR
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(2) Fast-track environmental cleanups that contemplate the
investment of federal cleanup money at installations where cleanup
could be accomplished sooner; and the appointment of facility-
specific BRAC Cleanup Teams composed of military, state and EPA
representatives who would share responsibility for developing and
implementing BRAC Cleanup Plans;51
(3) The appointment of transition coordinators at major closing
bases to work directly with the community and the local
redevelopment authorities as ombudsmen to reduce red tape;"
(4) Easier access to transition and redevelopment assistance for
workers and communities; and5 3
(5) Economic development planning grants to base closure
communities.54
Much of the five-part plan was subsequently adopted into law." In
response to public pressure in favor of revitalizing communities
affected by BRAC Commission's closure decisions, in 1993
Congress also enacted the Base Closure Community Assistance Act
to allow below-market or no-cost transfers of BRAC facilities to
local redevelopment authorities. 6 With this dramatic shift in policy,
few BRAC facilities were conveyed for consideration after 1993. In
October 1999, President Clinton signed the FY 2000 defense budget
that, (1) increased the opportunities for local redevelopment
FORCE, How CAN AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CONVEYANCE (EDC) BE
OBTAINED? (1997).
51. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub.
L. No. 103-160, §§ 2901(6), 2911 (1993).
52. See id. § 2915. Less than one week after President Clinton
announce his five part plan, DoD named senior military officials to serve
as transition coordinators at every major base. See Podagrosi, supra note
14, at 6.
53. See id. § 2901(2)-(3) (stating that helping displaced employees
from these military installations is in the best interest of the United States).
. 54. See Pub. L. No. 103-421, § 2(e), 108 Stat. 4346, 4352 (1994)
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 2687 (1994)). In October 1994, Congress also
enacted the Base Closure Community Redevelopment and Homeless
Assistance Act of 1994, which exempted most BRAC closures from the
much-criticized Stewart B. McKinney Homeless Assistance Act.
55. Senator David Pryor (D-AR) proposed much of the five-part
plan as an amendment to the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 2903 et seq., 107 Stat. 1547, 1909
(1993) (also known as the Pryor Amendment).
56. Pub. L. No. 103-160, §§ 2901(7), 2903(a).
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authorities to obtain bases for no consideration, (2) provided that the
proceeds from any sale or lease of the former base are to be
reinvested by the local redevelopment authority into the installation
itself (and its infrastructure) for at least the first seven years, and (3)
ensured that the local redevelopment authority accepts control of the
property promptly. 7 Since 1993, approximately fifty-one bases
below market economic development conveyances are pending or
have been completed. 8
Congress's first effort to indemnify a transferee of a closing
BRAC installation occurred in 1991 at Pease Air Force Base.
Congress enacted a special bill designed to indemnify the State of
New Hampshire and potential lenders against pre-existing
environmental contamination at the base. 9 Thereafter, Congress
sought to adopt a standard "one size fits all" indemnification
provision to address closures generally in the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993.60
BRAC section 330 is drafted broadly enough to apply to entities
that acquire ownership of the closed military installation (e.g., local
redevelopment authorities) and any lessee (private contractors),
lender or assignee. It has overcome serious barriers to the transfer of
contaminated military bases to non-federal control. However, the
statutory indemnity does not apply to GOCO facilities.
Congress had determined a statutory indemnity was necessary to
transfer BRAC installations because the fear of inheriting
environmental liabilities inhibited the ability of local redevelopment
57. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 2821, 113 Stat. 512, 853 (1999).
58. Podagrasi, supra note 14, at 3.
59. National Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 1991,
Pub. L. No. 101-511, § 8056(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1856, 1887 (1991).
60. Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 330, 106 Stat. 2315, 2371, 2373
(1992), [hereinafter BRAC § 330], as amended by Pub. L. No. 103-160,
107 Stat. 1547, 1745 (1993). The relevant portions of BRAC § 330 provide
that the Secretary of Defense shall, hold harmless, defend and indemnify in
full [transferees] from and against any suit, claim, demand or action,
liability, judgment, cost or other fee arising out of any claim for personal
injury or property damage (including death, illness, or loss of or damage to
property or economic loss) that results from, or is in any manner predicated
upon, the release or threatened release of any hazardous substance,
pollutant or contaminant, or petroleum and petroleum derivative as a result
of Department of Defense's activities at any military installation (or
portion thereof) that is closed pursuant to a base closure law.
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authorities to obtain capital.6 In order to address CERCLA's strict
and several liability provisions that stalled BRAC conveyances, the
government agreed to indemnify future transferees for
environmental liabilities arising from ownership or operations at the
closed installation.62
IV. DoD's ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AT GOCO FACILITIES
Whereas future owners and operators of BRAC installations enjoy
the protection of a statutory indemnity under BRAC section 330,
GOCO facilities enjoy (i) pro-contractor facility use contracts, (ii)
statutory assurances of government cleanup, and (iii) favorable case
law.63 Standard facility use contracts during the last five decades, and
the relevant provisions of the Defense Acquisition Regulations and
superseding Federal Acquisition Regulations incorporated into these
contracts, do not impose liability on GOCO contractors for changing
environmental laws, long-defunct industrial practices, or the
environmental legacy of aging DoD facilities.' 4 The federal
procurement rules have never been read, absent extraordinary
circumstances of contractor misconduct, to impose environmental
liability on GOCO contractors retroactively. Even DoD grudgingly
admits that the Federal Acquisition Regulations would allow GOCO
contractors to be reimbursed under facility use contracts for
61. See 1998 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 56. Congress
authorized DoD to indemnify future owners to facilitate lease and transfer
of property.
62. See R. Wegman & R. Bailey, The Challenge of Cleaning Up
Military Wastes When U.S. Bases Are Closed, 21 ECOLOGY L.Q. 865, 918-
21 (1994) (citing BRAC § 330). As early as 1992, the government
recognized that any serious prospect of transferring bases would be
undermined unless DoD was authorized by statute to provide adequate
indemnity protection for transferees of contaminated military installations.
In response, Congress enacted legislation in 1993 to overcome the Anti-
Deficiency Act for all BRAC installations. The Anti-Deficiency Act, 31
U.S.C. § 1341 (1994), limited the ability of executive branch officials to
enter into contracts for future payment of money in advance of (or excess
to) existing congressional appropriations. Thus, DoD's ability to
contractually indemnify parties for future liabilities at closing bases was
expressly limited in the absence of express congressional action for such
future indemnification. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A)-(B) (1994).
63. See discussion infra Parts IV.A-C.
64. See discussion infra Part IV.A.
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environmental cleanup costs, absent "contractor malfeasance."65 The
cleanup costs would then be passed on to the government through
forward pricing of goods and services, rendering the cost of goods
and services to the DoD more expensive and making the government
ultimately responsible for the cost of cleanup at its plants.
A. Facility Use Contracts Do Not Impose Liability on Contractors
for Environmental Remediation
The terms in the standard GOCO facility use contracts are
generally consistent among GOCO plants and have not changed
significantly over time, particularly on environmental issues. GOCO
facility use contracts, from the 1940s through the 1980s, establish a
consistent and favorable rule that GOCO contractors shall be held
harmless for environmental degradation at government-owned
facilities and any resulting damages to the property of third
persons.6 As a general proposition, a GOCO contractor assumes no
risk of loss or damage to the GOCO facility (which would include
environmental degradation), unless the contractor failed to procure
government-required insurance, the damage related to the failure to
comply with the provisions of the facility use contract, or the
damage arose from willful misconduct or lack of good faith.67 In
addition, the GOCO contractors could seek reimbursement for
various non-insured liabilities and damages to third parties arising
out of the contractor's performance of the government contract.
Three standard Federal Acquisition Regulations ("FAR")
provisions shape the historical allocation of environmental risks at
GOCO plants: (1) "Liability for Facilities;"68 (2) "Insurance-
65. See 1997 GAO Report, supra note 29, at 43 (citing Letter of
Sheri W. Goodman, Deputy Undersecretary, Dep't of Def.).
66. See id. at 1-6. Historically, military departments have had
difficulty shifting environmental cleanup costs to contractors because,
among other things, cleanup costs are reimbursable under government
contracts); Id. at 43 (citing Letter of Sheri W. Goodman, Deputy
Undersecretary, Dep't of Def. explaining to the GAO the difficulty in
recovering costs from GOCO contractors because environmental cleanup
costs incurred by contractors are reimbursable under the Federal
Acquisition Regulations).
67. See 48 C.F.R. § 52.228-7(e) (1999).
68. Id. § 52.245-8.
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Liability to Third Persons;"69 and (3) "Indemnification of the
Government."7 These standard procurement regulations for GOCO
facility use contracts remained basically unchanged over twenty
years from the 1960s through the promulgation of the FARs in
1984."' The standard "Liability for Facilities" provision provides that
the GOCO contractor "shall not be liable for any loss or destruction
of, or damage to, the facilities or for expenses incidental to such loss,
destruction or damage .. ". . " Although FAR 52.245-8, which is
incorporated by reference into facility use contracts, recognizes
certain limited exceptions to the general rule of contractor
nonliability, releases of contamination to the environment during
industrial operations are not among them, especially where DoD has
controlled the contractor's industrial and environmental management
practices as far back as the 1940s.
B. Statutory Covenants of CERCLA Section 120(h)
In addition to favorable contract provisions, federal law squarely
imposes cleanup obligations on DoD. As a general proposition, the
federal Superfund law provides certain statutory assurances of the
government's commitment to complete the remediation of
environmental contamination at DoD and non-DoD federal facilities.
In 1986, Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act (SARA),73 which, among other things, amended
CERCLA section 120 and imposed specific environmental
warranties on the federal government. These warranties must be
expressly included within the deed conveying the federal property to
the nonfederal owner.74
69. Id. § 52.228-7.
70. Id. § 52.245-11.
71. See Mark J. Connor, Government Owned-Contractor Operated
Munitions Facilities: Are They Appropriate in the Age of Strict
Environmental Compliance and Liability? 131 MIL. L. REv. 1-54 (1991).
72. 48 C.F.R. § 52.245-8(b) (1999). Prior to 1984, the contract
regulations provided that the contractor "shall be reimbursed for certain
liabilities to third persons not compensated by insurance or otherwise."
Defense Acquisition Regulation ("DAR") 7-203.22 (1980). After 1984,
this provision was amended to comply with the Anti-Deficiency Act's bar
against imposing liability. on the federal government in excess of available
Congressional appropriations. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994).
73. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9671-9675 (1994).
74 Id. § 9620(h)(3) (contents of deeds).
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Specifically, CERCLA section 120(h)75 sets forth requirements
and procedures that all federal agencies must follow to transfer real
property to non-federal ownership where there is (or has been)
environmental contamination.76 Since the addition of CERCLA
section 120(h) fifteen years ago, the federal government has
transferred hundreds of formerly contaminated properties to non-
federal owners. The four rounds of BRACs alone involved the
closure and realignment of 451 bases, approximately 205 of which
required environmental cleanup.77 DoD has in fact identified over
5,300 potentially contaminated sites at the BRAC facilities."
The "primary purpose of section 120(h) was to ensure that
property contaminated by the federal government is environmentally
restored by the federal government before being conveyed outside
the federal government."79 Accordingly, for at least the last fifteen
years, CERCLA section 120(h)(3) has mandated that all deeds
transferring federal real property where hazardous substances have
been stored, released, or disposed of, contain the following covenant:
"[A]ll remedial action necessary to protect human health and the
environment with respect to any [hazardous] substance remaining on
the property has been taken before the date of such transfer."8
Of note, CERCLA section 120 provides only certain limited
government warranties of its own cleanup activities; it does not
purport to indemnify future owners of federal property. In fact, the
Anti-Deficiency Act" instructs that the government cannot, absent
an act of Congress, indemnify private parties. The Act prohibits
executive branch officials from entering into indemnity agreements
and committing future appropriations absent express congressional
authorization. In 1989, in a rare exception, the Navy agreed to
contractually indemnify a contractor at the former St. Louis NWIRP
for any environmental liabilities if it agreed to purchase the federal
75. Id. § 9620(h).
76. Id.
77. See 1998 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 25, 53.
78. See 1996 GAO Report, supra note 31, at 4.
79. EPA, OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE,
GUIDANCE FOR EvALUATION OF FEDERAL AGENCY DEMONSTRATIONS
THAT REMEDIAL ACTIONS ARE OPERATING PROPERLY AND
SUCCESSFULLY UNDER CERCLA SECTION 120(h)(3) 2 (Aug. 1996).
80. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii)(I) (1994).
81. See 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (1994).
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property. 2 The Navy now considers the St. Louis indemnity to be an
aberration and probably unenforceable under the Anti-Deficiency
Act and has declined to enter into similar agreements. Consistent
with the Anti-Deficiency Act, CERCLA section 120(h) does not
include a BRAC-style indemnity; it is limited to a statutory covenant
that the government will undertake all necessary cleanup activities to
protect human health and the environment.
To date, GAO reports that DoD has incurred in excess of $9
billion in environmental cleanup costs at BRAC installations and
approximately $3 billion at GOCO facilities.83 GAO predicts that
DoD will likely incur $2.4 billion in environmental cleanup costs
until federal and state authorities determine that DoD has restored its
BRAC installations and further cleanup is not necessary.14 As GAO
states, "[e]ven though the Congress has established a 6-year period
for closing a base, there are no statutory deadlines for the cleanup
process."85
CERCLA section 120(h)(3) further requires the government to
include in the deed other enforceable representations, including the
obligation by the government to undertake additional cleanup after
transfer, as necessary." Procedurally, DoD must obtain state and
EPA concurrence that the federal government has completed all
required cleanup before DoD cleanup activities can be terminated,
either before or after conveyance.87 This statutory warranty applies to
all DoD, non-DoD, Department of Energy ("DoE"), BRAC and
GOCO real property.88
82. The contractor, McDonnell Douglas Corporation, was
indemnified by the DoD for potential environmental liabilities arising from
pre-existing contamination at the St. Louis NWIRP facility in order to
complete the contractor's purchase of the facility. This September 18, 1989
"Environmental Indemnity Agreement" pre-dated the enactment of
CERCLA section 120(h)'s covenants.
83. See 1998 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 46-58; see also 1997
GAO Report, supra note 29, at 2-3.
84. 1998 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 5.
85. 1996 GAO Report, supra note 31, at 5.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(A)(ii)(II) (1994).
87. Id. §§ 9620(f), 9621(f).
88. Id. § 9620(a).
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As shown in Table A below, the federal government has disposed
of over 5,300 properties during the last five years. 9
Table A
ANNUAL DISPOSAL OF FEDERAL PROPERTY








Within the DoE alone, eighty-four contaminated facilities are
currently listed as "subject to CERCLA section 120.""0 Moreover,
over 97 major BRAC military installations, closed and transferred to
local redevelopment authorities, remain subject to CERCLA section
120(h)'s warranties.91 In short, there have been literally thousands of
parcels of real property transferred by the federal government to
non-federal owners subject to the statutory covenant that the
government will take all remedial actions necessary to protect
human health and the environment, including additional cleanup
required after transfer.
The government's warranty under CERCLA section 120(h) has a
solid track record over the last fifteen years. There are no reported
89. Table A (E-mail from Nichelle B. Shoats, GAO Realty
Specialist, Office of Property Disposal, to Latham & Watkins) (Aug. 8,
2000) (on file with author).
90. U.S. DEP'T OF ENERGY, OFFICE OF ENvIRONMENTAL
MANAGEMENT, TWELFTH ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: FISCAL YEAR
1998 PROGRESS IN IMPLEMENTING SECTION 120 OF CERCLA ES-1 (Apr.
2000), available at http://www.em.doe.gov/rtc2000 (last visited Apr. 5,
2001).
91. 1998 GAO Report, supra note 3, at 6, 12, 51; 42 U.S.C. §
9620(a) (1994).
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cases or enforcement actions where the non-federal owners asserted
that the government breached its CERCLA section 120(h) warranty.
The last fifteen years of government implementation of CERCLA
section 120(h) demonstrate an encouraging commitment to the
process of transferring federal properties to non-federal owners
without concurrently transferring environmental liability. GAO
reports no examples of transferees involuntarily sharing DoD
cleanup costs.92
Under the 1992 amendments to CERCLA section 120(h), a
governmental remedial action is considered "complete" for purposes
of transfer if (1) the construction and installation of an "approved"
remedial design has been completed (e.g., pump-and-treat systems),
and (2) the selected remedy has been demonstrated to EPA to be
working "properly and successfully."93 Thus, the expectation of
long-term remedial activities at a GOCO facility does not necessarily
prohibit a timely conveyance for economic redevelopment.94
C. Courts Have Rejected Government Claims of GOCO Contractor
Liability For Past or Future Cleanup Costs
At various divested GOCO facilities courts have held the U.S.
government solely liable for cleanup costs.95 In February 1997, the
district court in Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chemical
Co.,96 apportioned 100 percent of all past and future environmental
92. 1996 GAO Report, supra note 31, at 19-20.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 9620(h)(3)(B) (1994).
94. Pub. L. No. 104-201, § 334, 110 Stat. 2422, 2486 (1996). Of
note, CERCLA section 120(h) was amended within the last several years
by Public Law No. 104-201, authorizing the EPA or the governor of a
State to approve transfer of contaminated federal property before
completion of all remedial actions required under CERCLA (or the
installation of all remedial equipment required by CERCLA), provided
EPA or the State determines that the property is suitable for early transfer
and there are adequate assurances that all remaining remedial actions will
be undertaken by DoD following the transfer.
95. See Steven G. Davison, Governmental Liability Under
CERCLA, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 47 (1997); Van S. Katzman, Note,
The Waste of War: Government CERCLA Liability at World War II
Facilities, 79 VA. L. REv. 1191, 1218 (1993) (discussing ownership
liability attaching to the U.S. government that held legal title and leased
equipment to American Viscose at Front Royal GOCO).
96. No. 83-7996 MRP (C.D. Cal. filed 1983).
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cleanup costs against the government at a former federally owned
rubber reserve plant in Los Angeles.97
Similar to the DoD industrial reserve program, the rubber reserve
program at issue in Dow Chemical was developed during World War
II through the Defense Plant Corporation and Reconstruction
Finance Corporation to supply the military with synthetic rubber.9"
The program once included in excess of fifty synthetic rubber plants.
After the Korean War the reserve plants were either sold or closed.99
The Los Angeles GOCO facility was owned by the government
between 1942 and 1955.00 Consistent with practices then in effect,
synthetic rubber by-products were disposed of in on-site unlined
lagoons, which led to extensive soil and groundwater
contamination.' ° On the combined weight of statutory authority
imposing environmental liability on the United States, and
contractual authority holding the GOCO contractor harmless for
facility damages, the government was ultimately assigned all
cleanup costs (in excess of $50 million).
The government's liability at GOCO facilities for past releases
arises from its dual role as the facility "owner" and "operator"
(government control of manufacturing and industrial operations).
Specifically, DoD invariably exercises sufficient control over the
GOCO contractor and specifications for goods and services to create
an agency relationship in the production of military equipment.' °
Courts have recognized that the government can be deemed an
"operator" under CERCLA at a federally owned industrial reserve
plant, provided the government exercises sufficient supervision and
control of plant operations. Government efforts to disclaim any
agency relationship with GOCO contractors at government-owned
plants have been consistently unsuccessful.
97. Id. at 54-55. The court's unpublished "Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law" are dated February 19, 1997. The former facility
contractor (Dow Chemical) was held harmless.
98. Id. at 7-8.
99. Id. at 32.
100. Id. at 8.
101. Id. at 6.
102. See, e.g., Cadillac Fairview/Cal., Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co.,
No. 83-7996 MRP (C.D. Cal. filed 1983), at 44-45; see also FMC Corp. v.
Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 843-44 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc) (finding
the requisite government control in the Los Angeles GOCO used to
provide synthetic plastic during World War II).
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The government occasionally relies upon FMC Corp. v. Dep 't of
Commerce"' as support for its position favoring government cost
sharing. The government is encouraged by the fact it was not
assessed 100 percent responsibility by the court."° Properly read,
however, FMC is actually favorable to contractors and undermines
the governments cost recovery position at GOCO facilities. Despite
the fact that CERCLA section 120(h)'s obligations and warranties do
not apply to the privately owned facility in FMC, and no government
contracts existed between FMC and the United States, the
government was nonetheless assessed significant liability on the sole
basis of its temporary control of a privately owned facility.0 5
The 440-acre Virginia facility in FMC was owned by three
companies at various times over forty-nine years (1940-89).16 The
government's War Production Board ordered production of high
tenacity rayon at the facility for only six-years (1942-48)."'
Although the War Production Board controlled rayon production at
the facility for only twelve percent of the facility's industrial life, the
government was ordered to contribute over twenty-six percent of the
cleanup costs." 8 Stated differently, the Virginia production facility
was privately owned at all relevant times and was operated
commercially eighty-eight percent of the time; however, despite the
absence of any CERCLA section 120(h) requirement for the
government to remediate a non-federal installation, the government
was still required to contribute twenty-six percent of the costs to
remediate the non-federal facility.
The Pennsylvania federal court in FMC assessed the United States
between $26-78 million in environmental cleanup costs as the
"owner" and "operator" at a privately owned plant for the events
surrounding the government's temporary takeover of the facility to
manufacture high-tenacity rayon during World War ll.1"9 The United
States was deemed to have exercised substantial control over the
manufacturing facility and its operations during the war."'
103. 29 F.3d 833 (3d Cir. 1994) (en banc).
104. Id. at 841.
105. Id. at 846.
106. Id. at 836.
107. Id. at 836-37.
108. Id. at 838.
109. FMC Corp. v. Dep't of Commerce, 29 F.3d 833, 846 (3d
Cir. 1994) (en banc).
110. Id. at 844.
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In contrast, at the "contractor-owned, contractor-operated"
National Defense Corporation Eau Claire, Wisconsin munitions
facility, the Army agreed initially to fund 100 percent of cleanup (up
to $5 million), despite the fact that the Army owned the facility only
between 1940-45."' For over four decades, the privately owned Eau
Claire facility supplied munitions to the Army."2 The facility,
however, contained government-owned equipment and buildings."3
To avoid losing production at the Eau Claire facility, the Army
agreed to fund past and future environmental cleanup activities,
despite the lack of evidence that any releases occurred during the
Army's ownership."4  The Army's reimbursement of past
environmental costs under the applicable production contracts at a
contractor-owned facility needed extraordinary contractual relief,
which was granted by the Contract Adjustment Board in 1988
pursuant to Public Law 85-804."' The Board acknowledged that, had
the Eau Claire facility been government-owned, the Army surely
would have financed the required environmental restoration."16
The Eau Claire contractor agreed to reimburse the Army fifty
percent of the cleanup costs at its private facility through offsets in
future production contracts." 7 Technically, the contractor contributed
nothing and was only forced to recognize fifty percent of cleanup
costs as an allowable indirect charge ultimately paid by the
government through forward pricing on production contracts. Of
note, because Eau Claire was privately owned, the government had
no obligations under CERCLA section 120(h) to warrant that it had
cleaned up the privately owned property.
In United States v. Shell Oil Co.," 8 the court apportioned to the
government 100 percent of past and future cleanup costs attributable
to the lawful disposal of the by-products of World War II-era
111. See Public Law 85-804 Application of National Defense
Corporation Eau Claire, Wisconsin, Army Contract Adjustment Board,






117. Public Law 85-804 Application of National Defense
Corporation Eau Claire, Wisconsin, Army Contract Adjustment Board,
Case No. 1231 (Mar. 25, 1988), available at 1988 WL 404951.
118. 13F.Supp.2d1018(C.D.Cal. 1998).
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aviation fuel by various oil companies at the McColl Superfund
site." 9 The case did not involve contamination at a GOCO facility,
but it did address the proper apportionment of contractual risk
between the government and a contractor for cleanup costs imposed
under modem environmental laws. During World War II, the
government required domestic petroleum companies to produce
massive quantities of aviation fuel. 2 ' Over fifty years later, the court
apportioned to the government 100 percent of the cleanup costs for
the aviation fuel program despite the fact that certain commingled
waste sent to the McColl site was generated by the oil companies in
support of their commercial operations, and government approval of
disposal at the McColl site in the 1940s was only "tacit.
1 21
The Shell Court apportioned all cleanup costs against the
government on the basis of the contracts assessing production costs
to the government and because of the "extensive" degree of
government oversight of the petroleum industry during the war.
122
The Court reasoned that the McColl cleanup arose from critical
national defense programs and was a "cost of war" that should be
bome by society as a whole.2 3 The logic of Shell applies to the
divestiture of all GOCO facilities, where cleanup relates to decades
of production-related waste generation in support of critical national
defense programs conducted at government-owned facilities.
In Gould Electronics Inc. v. United States, 24 the court held that
private parties could assert claims of contribution against the United
States for approximately $4.5 million in damages incurred in
connection with a former Army GOCO plant in Cold Spring, New
York, which manufactured batteries for DoD.2 2 The plant was built
between 1951-53 and operated by Sonotone Corp. under traditional
DoD facility use contracts from 1953 to 1962.126 The plant's
industrial waste water system, designed by the government,
contaminated the area's groundwater.'27 The plant was sold to
Sonotone in 1962 and operated privately thereafter until
119. Id. at 1026-27.
120. Id. at 1020.
121. Id. at 1023, 1026. .
122. Id. at 1022.
123. Id. at 1027.
124. 220 F.3d 169, 173-74 (3rd Cir. 2000).
125. Id.
126. Id. at 174-75.
127. Id. at 175.
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approximately 1979.128 Area residents sued the private owners in
state court and obtained a $4.5 million settlement. In addition, EPA
entered into a consent decree with the Army and the private owners
of the former GOCO.'19 The Third Circuit held that the private
owners could assert a contribution action against the United States in
federal court for the $4.5 million settlement arising from
contamination released at the former Army GOCO 30
No case law exists holding GOCO contractors, redevelopers, or
local municipalities liable for environmental contamination released
at GOCO facilities. The combination of favorable facility use
contracts, the governments statutory obligations under CERCLA
section 120(h), and favorable court authority all instruct that GOCO
contractors, redevelopers and local municipalities are not required to
indemnify the government for the operation of GOCOs under the
Defense Industrial Reserve Program. Cleanup responsibility squarely
rests with DoD, even after transfer to a non-federal owner.
V. DISPOSAL OF GOCO PLANTS UNDER FEDERAL REAL PROPERTY
TRADITIONAL DISPOSAL RULES
Unless Congress exempts specific federal property, all federal real
property disposals, including the conveyance of GOCO facilities, are
governed by the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act
of 1949 ("1949 Property Act")."' One notable category of property
excluded from the 1949 Property Act includes "military
installations" closed in accordance with the recommendations of the
Base Realignment and Closure Commission.'32 These DoD bases are
subject to the unique disposal rules incorporated into the BRAC laws
(e.g., "public benefit" and "economic development" conveyances).
Congress has expressly authorized DoD to dispose of excess
defense industrial reserve properties and plants through the General
Services Administration ("GSA"), applying the traditional property
disposal rule to obtain for the government fair market value for the
property.' Unless Congress directs otherwise, the disposal of
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 192 (3d
Cir. 2000).
131. See, e.g., 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-544 (1994).
132. See 40 U.S.C. § 48 4(q)(9) (1994).
133. See 10 U.S.C. § 2535(b)(F) (1994).
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GOCO facilities as either "excess" or "surplus" property is governed
by the 1949 Property Act.'34 Of note, "excess" and "surplus"
properties are not synonymous. "Excess" property remains federal
property, although the particular federal agency responsible for the
property may change. That is, "excess" property must be "screened"
and, if possible, transferred to another federal agency before it is
conveyed to non-federal parties. Only "excess" real property that is
not needed by any federal agency is, after a certain period of time,
declared "surplus" and prepared for transfer out of the federal
government and into the hands of nonfederal owners.'35
GSA regulations outline the government's process for the disposal
of surplus real property.'36 The disposal process is triggered when
agencies report "excess" real property to GSA, as required by
regulation.'37 A brief one to three month federal "screening" process
is then commenced to assess whether another agency needs the
property.'38 Interagency transfers of "excess" real property must be at
fair market value as conclusively determined by a GSA appraisal.'39
After the screening period, but before GSA may dispose of
"surplus" federal property to the private sector for consideration
through competitive bidding or negotiated sale, the agency must first
notify the state of the intended disposal and advise the state of
available programs to obtain the property at no cost. 4 ° The programs
available under existing law are limited in scope and generally
require prompt state action and federal agency "sponsorship."
Conceptually, the process is similar to a right of first refusal. For
instance, under the Surplus Property Act of 1944, Congress
authorized the Department of Transportation to "give" surplus
federal property to a state, or political subdivision of a state, in order
to develop, maintain or improve a public airport. 141 Under current
disposal regulations, however, the interested state (or local agency)
has only twenty-nine days after GSA provides notice of its intent to
134. See 40 U.S.C. § 485(h)(1) (1994).
135. 41 C.F.R. § 101-47.204-1 (1999).
136. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. § 101-47 (1999) (providing disposal
rules for surplus real property).
137. Id. § 101-47.202-1.
138. Id. § 101-47.203-5.
139. 41 C.F.R. § 101-47.203-7(f)(1) (1999).
140. Id. § 101-47.303-2(b).
141. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 47151-47153 (1994).
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dispose of surplus property to announce its commitment to submit an
application for a sponsored public airport conveyance.
The 1949 Property Act contemplates several permanent disposal
options for surplus GOCO property.1
42
A. Competitive Auctions and Negotiated Sales
Auctions are preferred over negotiated sales and involve
aggressive public advertisement to solicit competitive bids.
Ironically, the reason auction sales are preferred is because Congress
complained in 1958 of "unrealistic" low appraisals from local
appraisers, which appeared designed to serve local interests to the
detriment of the government in subsequent negotiated sales.' 43
Congress apparently did not contemplate the possibility, decades
later, of unrealistically high federal appraisals at GOCO plants. All
competitive bids may be rejected if GSA considers them to be
inadequate. "
Negotiated sales are permitted in the event competitive bids are
inadequate or the "character or conditions of the property or unusual
circumstances make it impractical to advertise publicly for
competitive bids and the fair market value of the property and other
satisfactory terms of disposal can be obtained by negotiation."' 14 5 The
regulations require a GSA appraisal for most negotiated sales, but
neither the government nor the private purchaser is bound by its
outcome. 46 The negotiation is designed to be a competitive, arm's-
length deal. The traditional process, however, assumes that a market
for the government property exists and environmental liabilities and
future cleanup costs can be fairly appraised.
B. Economic Development Conveyances
In 1988, the United States Air Force attempted to revitalize the
inactive GOCO divestiture program at its remaining Air Force Plants
through one of the following mechanisms: (1) sale of the plants to
current contractors; (2) "excess" transfers of plants to other federal
142. See 41 C.F.R. § 101-47.3 (1999).
143. See H.R. REP. No. 1763, at 2866, (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2861, 2866.
144. 41 C.F.R. § 101-47.304-7(a)(3) (1999).
145. Id. § 101-47.304-9(a)(3).
146. See id. § 101-47.303-4.
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agencies; (3) conversion of no-rent "facilities use" contracts to rent-generating leases or; (4) closure of plants and surplus disposals. 14 7 At
roughly the same time, the Navy sought to accelerate the divestiture
of its nineteen remaining GOCO facilities, and the Army sought to
reduce the number of its twenty-seven GOCO plants.148 The specific
Air Force GOCOs under scrutiny in 1988 included Air Force Plant
19 in San Diego, Air Force Plant 3 in Dallas, Air Force Plant 70 in
Sacramento, and Air Force Plant 78 in Brigham City, Utah. 149 Five
years later in 1993, the Air Force accelerated plans to divest Air
Force Plant 6 in Marietta, GA; Air Force Plant 59 in Binghampton,
NY; Air Force Plant 42 in Palmdale, CA; and Air Force Plant 44 in
Tucson, AZ. 5 ° However, the Air Force did not enjoy much success
in selling the facilities to the existing contractors and typically, as an
interim revenue generating measure, converted no-rent "facilities
use" contracts into rent-generating leases.' However, as with other
costs of doing business at GOCOs, the contractors were allowed to
recapture their rent in the goods and services provided the
government.
As a general proposition, Congress may at any time elect to
dispose of specific DoD property outside the scope of the 1949
Property Act.'52 In so doing, DoD property may be disposed of by
the respective military departments without direct GSA involvement
at below fair market value or for no consideration at all. Of note, at
least nine GOCO facilities have been conveyed to counties, local
municipalities or redevelopment authorities for purposes of
economic redevelopment (or other reasons) pursuant to special
Congressional legislation enacted between 1995-2000 and, notably,
147. John Chandler, Air Force's Plant 42 May Face Closure:
The Only California Facility is Among Eight Nationwide to be Studied,
L.A. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1993, available at 1993 WL 2263526.
148. 1994 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 3.
149. Tom Burgess, Air Force Will Sell Defense Plant Here, SAN
DIEGO UNION-TRIBUNE, Apr. 7, 1988, available at 1988 WL 5899607.
150. Id.
151. See 1994 GAO Report, supra note 9, at 5-6. The Air Force
planned to divest all GOCOs by 2000, yet it is still paying for Air Force
Plant 36 in Ohio sold to General Electric in 1989.
152. Pub. L. No. 103-160, § 2903(a)(C)(i), 107 Stat. 1547, 1912
(1993); 40 U.S.C.§ 474 (exemptions from Act, including certain DoD
activities).
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with limited conditions and reversionary rights."3 The model for no-
cost conveyances of these industrial reserve plants is the well-
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2 Air Force Plant No. Broome County FY 1995 P.L. 103- GE, Martin
59, Johnson City Indus. Dev. Agency, 337 § 2832 Marietta
(Westover), NY NY
3. Naval Weapons Town of Riverhead, FY 1995 P.L. 103-337 Northrop
Indus. Reserve NY § 2833 Grumman
Plant, Calverton, NY
4 Indiana Army State of Indiana FY 1996 P.L. 104- ICI Americas,
Ammunition Plant, 106 § 2858 Dupont
Charleston, IN
5 Naval Weapons City of McGregor, FY 1996 P.L. 104- Hercules
Indus. Reserve TX 106 § 2868
Plant, McGregor,
TX
6 Air Force Plant No. Columbus Municipal FY 1997 P.L. 104-201 McDonnell
85, Columbus, OH Airport Authority § 2853 Douglas
7 Naval Weapons County of Nassau, FY 1998 P.L. 105- Northrop
Indus. Reserve Long Island, NY 85 § 2852 Grumman
Plant, Bethpage, NY
8 Naval Weapons City of Dallas, TX FY 2000 P.L. 106-65 § Northrop
Indus. Reserve 2851 Grumman
Plant, Dallas, TX
9 Twin Cities Army City of Arden Hills, FY 2000 P.L. 106-65 Alliant
Ammunition Plant, MN and Ramsey §2840 Techsystems
Arden Hills, MN County, MN
153. See infra, Table B, compiled by the author.
154. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DOD BASE REUSE
IMPLEMENTATION MANUAL § 7 (Dec. 1997).
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Congress has typically authorized no-cost conveyances of GOCO
facilities through the annual defense budget. One or more of the
following conditions have been attached to previous facility-specific
legislation: (i) the GOCO property must generally be used for
economic redevelopment; (ii) the United States shall retain a five-
year reversionary interest to ensure the GOCO property is actually
used for economic redevelopment purposes; and/or (iii) if the
municipality sells the property to a private entity, the municipality
may be required to pay the United States fair market value for the
gifted property to discourage "flipping."'
VI. A CONSISTENT RECORD OF GOVERNMENT-FUNDED
ENVIRONMENTAL CLEANUP AT GOCO FACILITIES
The remainder of this article examines successful no-cost GOCO
conveyances where the government retained environmental liability.
A. Air Force Plant 3, Tulsa, Oklahoma
The land comprising Air Force Plant 3 ("AFP 3") was originally
purchased by the City of Tulsa. In 1940, the City of Tulsa purchased
land adjacent to the municipal airport for an aircraft plant and, in
1941, Douglas Aircraft Company assumed operations.'56 A
handwritten note that accompanied the warranty deed transferring
the property to the U.S. government stated that ownership of the
property would revert to Tulsa if the facility were no longer
needed. 5During World War II, the plant was used to assemble bombers for
the Army Air Corps.'58 The plant was closed from 1945 to 1950 and
used for storage,'59 but in 1950 it was reactivated for the manufacture
155. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year
2000, Pub. L. No. 106-65, § 2851, 113 Stat. 512, 863 (1999) (Dallas
NWIRP No. 387 special legislation).
156. See Curtis Killman, City Ready to Take Over Bomber Plant,
TULSA WORLD, Nov. 29, 1999, available at 1999 WL 5421762.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See general information of Air Force Plant 3 and other Air
Force Plants at website of AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS CENTER,
ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENTAL, SAFETY AND HEALTH DIV.,
ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE, WRIGHT-PATTERSON AFB, OHIO
[hereinafter AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS CENTER], at http://www.
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of B-47 Stratojets. 6 ° In 1962, Rockwell International began leasing
thirty percent of the plant to manufacture aerospace products.1 61
McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company continued to operate the
remaining seventy percent for maintenance of military and
commercial aircraft as well as for the manufacture of aircraft
components. 62 McDonnell Douglas terminated its lease in June
1994, while Rockwell remained at the GOCO plant.
In 1993, both the City of Tulsa and the Tulsa Airport Authority
became interested in AFP 3 after the Air Force dramatically
increased McDonnell Douglas's facility rent from $400,000 to $5.4
million annually, which threatened to evict the contractor.'63 For
years, city officials had sought ownership of the facility and were
assisted in their effort by Senator Nickles."6 In September 1994, the
City of Tulsa became the primary tenant, subleasing twenty percent
of the plant to Rockwell, the remaining eighty percent was
mothballed.165 The City of Tulsa subsequently subleased additional
space to Rockwell (Boeing), and to airfreight and warehousing
operations.'66 The City of Tulsa has responsibility for facility
maintenance and environmental management of major systems and
operations. Rockwell retained responsibility for permits and waste
management activities relative to its production-specific
operations."7 A quitclaim deed transferring title of the property to
Tulsa was executed on December 6, 1999. The City of Tulsa is now
the owner and operator of the property.
The Air Force considered AFP 3 to be one of the least-polluted
GOCO plants it managed. Still, the Air Force spent over $6 million
to remove low-level radioactive waste resulting from the disposal of
radioactive instrument dials and vacuum tubes. 68 A $1.2 million





163. See Mitch Maurer & Jim Myers, City, State Seek Suspension
of Air Force-McDonnell Talks; Congressional Review Eyed, TULSA
WORLD, Oct. 19, 1993, available at 1993 WL 9657891.
164. See Killman, supra note 156.
165. See AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS CENTER, supra note 159.
166. See Killman, supra note 156.
167. See AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS CENTER, supra note 159.
168. See Killman, supra note 156.
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wastewater treatment system, installed to clean solvent-laden
groundwater, was closed because area groundwater had been
degraded and any future development seemed unlikely. Rockwell
and the City of Tulsa did not assume any cleanup costs. DoD paid
all costs.'69 The quitclaim deed transferring the property to Tulsa
specifically warranted that DoD had taken all remedial action
necessary under CERCLA section 120 and would remain liable for
any further necessary cleanup activities.'70
Tulsa has begun leasing areas of the plant not already occupied by
Boeing. In December, 1999, Amtran Corp. announced plans to lease
the property from Tulsa.'7' Amtran's new school bus manufacturing
plant will create more than 1,200 new jobs, generate $3.2 million in
tax revenues, and boost Tulsa's economy by over $80 million
annually.7 2 Redevelopment plans at Tulsa also include the
construction of an air cargo warehouse on thirty-five acres of former
AFP 3 property near the airport. To facilitate disposal, Air Force
officials not only supported the no-cost conveyance, the government
agreed to contribute up to $10 million toward the modification of the
plant for new business purposes. 173
B. Air Force Plant 85, Columbus,. Ohio
AFP 85 is an aircraft manufacturing facility, adjacent to the Port
Columbus International Airport, consisting of approximately 3.3
million square feet of building space located on 179 acres. Opened in
1941, AFP 85 was first owned by the Navy and operated by Curtiss-
Wright Corp., which used the facility to build "Helldiver"
bombers.' 74 North American Aviation assumed plant operations in
1950 and operated the plant until the 1970s, when Rockwell began
169. Id.
170. Quitclaim Deed Conveying AFP 3 to City of Tulsa, Art.
II.B, at pp. 3-4 (Dec. 1, 1999) (on file with the FORDHAM
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL).
171. See Russell Ray, Bus Plant to Bring Spin-Off Jobs, TULSA
WORLD, Dec. 8, 1999, available at 1999 WL 5422617.
172. Id.
173. See Mitch Maurer, AF Plant Conveyance Pattern Eyed,
TULSA WORLD, Oct. 21, 1994, available at 1994 WL 8408373.
174. See Mike Pramik, Flight Into the Future After a Half-
Century Association with Aviation: The Old McDonnell Douglas Plant
Might Have a Very Different New Life, COLUMBUS DISPATCH,. Jan. 19,
1997, available at 1997 WL 7350651.
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using the plant to build tactical missiles. In 1983, the property was
transferred to the Air Force. McDonnell Douglas operated the plant
from 1988 until 1992.175 DoD studies conducted from 1984 to 1.990
identified ten sources of potential hazardous waste contamination,
including chemical spills in nearby streams and soil
contamination. 176
Ultimately 220 acres were conveyed to the City of Columbus at no
cost, pursuant to 1997 special congressional legislation, with the
generic requirement that the Columbus Airport Authority use the
acreage for "public airport purposes."1" Separately, approximately
180 acres of AFP 85 were sold through a closed-bid public auction
to "4300 East Fifth Avenue Limited Liability Company of
Columbus" in 1997 for $15.3 million.178 The Columbus divestiture
was complicated by the fact that the GOCO property donated to the
airport authority for the additional runway underlies, in part, several
buildings included within the auction. 17' To resolve the situation, the
Columbus Airport Authority has apparently agreed to alter or move
the affected buildings for the benefit of the owners of the private
parcels. 180
In 1997, Executive Jet Inc., which operates a time-share business
jet service, began leasing part of the GOCO property. 8' The City of
Columbus was instrumental in promoting the plant's development.
The city provided a sixty percent abatement on property taxes and a
fifty percent job tax credit for ten years. The Columbus Department
of Trade and Development also promoted the project, agreeing to
fund infrastructure improvements such as road widening.8 2
175. Id.
176. See National Priorities List for Uncontrolled Hazardous
Waste Sites, 56 Fed. Reg. 5,600 (Feb. 11, 1991) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pt. 300).
177. See Pramik, supra note 174.
178. Id.; see also Brian R. Ball, Tenants Line Up to Take Space
at Former Plant 85, BUSINESS FIRST-COLUMBUS, Oct. 31, 1997, available
at http://columbus.bcentral.com/columbus/stories/1997/11/03/story5.html?
(last visited Apr. 5, 2001).
179. Interview with various Columbus, Ohio officials.
180. Id.
181. See Mike Pramik, Executive Jet to Lease Site Near Airport,
COLUMBUS DISPATCH, July 11, 1997, available at 1997 WL 12511818.
182. Id.
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C. Air Force Plant 59, Johnson City, New York
AFP 59 was built in 1942 by the Defense Plant Corporation. 83
Remington Rand, the first manufacturer to occupy the plant,
produced aluminum aircraft propellers from 1942 to 1945.184 In 1948
the building was occupied by the Aeronautics and Ordnance Systems
Division of General Electric (GE), which manufactured armament
systems and engine controls.'85 During the 1970s and 1980s,
production changed from manufacturing mechanical systems to
producing electronic and computer systems, such as flight controls
and internal navigation and guidance systems.'86 In 1993, Martin
Marietta acquired GE Aerospace and took over operation of AFP
59.87 Lockheed and Martin Marietta merged in 1995, and the plant is
currently operated by Lockheed Martin Control Systems.'8 8 The
facility was used to produce highly sophisticated avionics and
electronic controls.189
Historical manufacturing operations at AFP 59 generated a variety
of waste products, and shallow groundwater beneath the plant has
shown low levels of volatile organic compounds (VOCs). 9'
However, even with intensive soil and groundwater monitoring, no
source of contamination has been located at AFP 59.191 Since 1993,
the Air Force has been financially contributing to the Johnson City
groundwater treatment system while, concurrently, conducting
investigations to locate the source of groundwater contamination and
determine the most cost-effective remediation. 92 The Air Force
cooperated with the State of New York in upgrading Johnson City's
Camden Street Water Treatment Plant, including a long-term
groundwater monitoring program. 193
183. See Air Force Plant 59: Binghampton, New York (providing
general information about the plant, which was formerly known as Air
Force Plant 59, Johnson City, New York), at http://www.ascenv.wpafb.
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The Air Force demanded that GE purchase the facility from the
Air Force, essentially as retribution for being able to use the GOCO
facility rent-free to produce a variety of DoD military systems. 9 4
GE, however, declined to purchase the facility.'95 Subsequently, GE
and the Air Force exchanged threats: the Air Force threatened to
reduce reliance on GE in its production contracts, and GE threatened
to close its Johnson City facility and relocate over one thousand jobs
elsewhere.'9 6  '
Fearing that this situation would be devastating to Johnson City
and surrounding Broome County, the Broome County Industrial
Development Agency ("BCIDA") attempted to broker a solution that
was mutually beneficial to GE and Johnson City.'97 BCIDA is a non-
profit organization in Broome County with a long history of
purchasing, managing, and redeveloping property within the
County.'98 Consistent with these goals of industrial redevelopment,
BCIDA became aggressively proactive at AFP 59. Because of a lack
of resources, however, BCIDA was not in a position to purchase
AFP 59 from the Air Force at the facility's "fair market value."'99
,BCIDA approached Congressman Maurice Hinchey for assistance
in proposing defense budget legislation to authorize a no-cost
conveyance for the facility-the rationale being that congressional
willingness to give away (at most, a nominal cost) enormous BRAC
facilities should easily extend to much smaller GOCO facilities."'
Congressman Hinchey agreed, and in 1995 Congress authorized the
no-cost conveyance of AFP 59 to the BCIDA.2°' This transfer has
allowed Lockheed Martin Control Systems to keep its headquarters
in Johnson City and provide the area with approximately 1,800
194. Telephone Interview with Richard D'Atillio, Broome







200. Telephone Interview with Richard D'Atillio, Broome
County Industrial Development Agency, Binghampton, NY (July 13,
2000).
201. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995,
Pub. L. No. 103-337, § 2832, 108 Stat. 2663, 3060 (1994).
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jobs.212 The parties subsequently entered into a ten-year lease with
two ten-year options. 3 Currently, BCIDA has all rights and powers
over the property pursuant to a lease in furtherance of conveyance.
AFP 59 will be deed transferred to BCIDA when the Air Force
finishes its environmental remediation of AFP 59.204
D. Navy GOCO, Pomona, California
At the former GOCO facility in Pomona, the Navy funded 100
percent of the $4.7 million, five-year environmental cleanup, which
included extensive heavy metals, petroleum and solvent soil
remediation.2 ° The 160-acre GOCO facility in Pomona was
purchased by the Navy in 195 1.206 The facility was operated by
General Dynamics as a GOCO facility through 1992 and
subsequently operated by Hughes Missile Systems Company
through plant closure in 1996.207 Unlike certain other GOCO plants,
the city agreed to pay consideration for the federal property.
In 1996, the Navy and GSA conveyed most parcels of the facility
to the State of California and then to the City of Pomona for
approximately $13 million. 28 The state also agreed to swap 50,000
acres of state land near Death Valley, California in support of the
federal Desert Protection Act.209 Certain parcels were retained by the
state and used for public benefit purposes, such as road construction,
202. See BAE Systems homepage, at http://www.
lmcontrolsystems.com/facilities.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2001).
203. Broome County Industrial Development Agency &
Lockheed Martin Corporation, Lease Agreement, Air Force Plant 59 (Mar.
23, 1997) (on file with author).
204. Telephone Interview with Richard D'Atillio, Broome
County Industrial Development Agency, Binghampton, NY (July 13,
2000).
205. Interview with Edward Robles, former Hughes Facility
Manager for Pomona GOCO (Mar. 13, 2001).
206. NIRUP SITE INVESTIGATION & REMEDIATION REPORT (Mar.
1997).
207. Id.
208. Randyl Drummer, Inland Empire Focus Laying Big Ghosts
to Rest: Former Defense Sites Closed 3 Years Ago Finally Near Reuse,
THE Bus. PRESS/CALIFORNIA, Mar. 24, 1997, available at 1997 WL
7751544.
209. San Gabriel Valley Conversion Work Begins at Missile
Plant, LOS ANGELES TIMES, May 13, 1997, available at 1997 WL
2210283.
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recreation and a school extension."' Other city-owned parcels were
used for redevelopment, such as furniture manufacturing
operations."' Two major furniture companies moved to the former
GOCO facility, promising 1,850 local jobs immediately and up to
4,000 jobs over the next ten years.2"
E. Navy GOCO, Fridley, Minnesota
At the eighty-three acre Fridley industrial reserve facility, which is
located north of Minneapolis and adjoins the Mississippi River, one
parcel has been privately owned by FMC (now United Defense)
since around 1964, and the other parcel has consistently been owned
by the Navy."' The facility has been in operation since 1941 and has
extensive groundwater contamination. The Navy is seeking to sell
the GOCO property to the current contractor, United Defense. 14
Most of the Fridley facility's manufacturing activities are now
devoted to Army artillery development and modernization."
Nevertheless, to date the Navy has spent approximately $20-30
million in Fridley environmental cleanup costs and expects to spend
another $20 million to complete restoration.2 6 Past and future
cleanup costs are expected to exceed $50 million. Because the site is
on the Superfund list, the Navy has entered into a Federal Facilities
Agreement with EPA and the State of Minnesota to accomplish
cleanup.217
In 1997, the Navy advised GAO that it would fund the $40-50
million cleanup at Fridley.211 Since then, the contractor and the Navy
have been involved in on-again, off-again negotiations for the
potential purchase of the GOCO. Until recently, the contractor
agreed to be an anchor tenant for a future purchaser and for years
210. Id.
211. Drummer, supra note 208.
212. Id.
213. See 1997 GAO Report, supra note 29, at 28-31 (citing a
report to the Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and
Criminal Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, House
of Representatives).
214. Id. at 28.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 29.
217. Id. at 30.
218. Id. at 29-30.
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declined to purchase the facility. To date, the contractor has not
assumed, without reimbursement, any of the past or future
environmental cleanup costs.
F. Navy GOCO, Bethpage, Long Island, New York
The Bethpage GOCO facility was established in the late 1930s and
consists of non-contiguous Navy-owned and Northrop Grumman-
owned parcels.z 9 Of the 500 acres originally owned by Grumman at
Bethpage, the contractor has sold most of this property. The
contractor-owned parcels were used to support DoD related
programs. The Navy currently owns a 105-acre parcel and a 5-acre
parcel, which are listed on the state's Superfund list because of
extensive groundwater contamination.22 ° Cleanup has been underway
for the past two to three years. 2 ' The Navy expects to convey the
government-owned parcels to Nassau County at no cost, pursuant to
special 1998 legislation upon completion of the cleanup.2
Most heavy industrial manufacturing of DoD aircraft components
assembled at Calverton and elsewhere took place at the Bethpage
facility, more particularly the "Plant 3" complex that is the
centerpiece of the Navy-owned 105-acre parcel. Grumman
Aerospace was the only contractor to operate the Bethpage GOCO
facility from the 1940s through the 1994 merger with Northrop
Corporation. A regional plume of groundwater contamination exists,
and an interim groundwater treatment system has been installed at
Navy expense.223 Various regional manufacturing activities (non-
Grumman) have also contributed to off-site groundwater
contamination.224 Because of the mixed private and government
ownership of property and buildings at Bethpage, cost allocation is
219. Alan J. Wax, Nassau Expected to Get Navy's 105 Acres:
Bethpage Site Would be Privately Developed, NEWSDAY (May 10, 1999),
available at 1999 WL 8171187.
220. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION
PROPOSED REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN FOR NWIRP BETHPAGE (July 2000).
221. Id.
222. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-85, § 2852, 111 Stat. 2008 (1997).
223. NEW YORK STATE DEP'T OF ENVTL. CONSERVATION,
PROPOSED REMEDIAL ACTION PLAN FOR NwIRP BETHPAGE 6-7 (July
2000).
224. Id.
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conceptually complicated. Those allocation issues are currently the
subject of discussions with Navy.
G. Allegheny Ballistics Laboratory, West Virginia
The 1,600-acre Navy-owned Allegheny Ballistics Laboratory in
Mineral County, West Virginia has produced munitions and
propulsion systems since 1945225 and has over 100 separate waste
dumps.226 Accordingly, there is extensive on-site contamination.227
State inspectors cited the GOCO facility thirteen times between 1980
and 1993 for hazardous waste violations. 28 Hercules Inc. operated
the GOCO facility from 1945-95 and from 1967-68 as a "mixed use"
DoD and commercial facility.229 Alliant Techsystems, Inc. currently
operates the GOCO facility. 30
Navy committed to the State of West Virginia that it would spend
between $2 and 3 million over the next five years at this GOCO
facility for purposes of cleanup.23' Despite the facility's uneven
compliance record, the GOCO contractor has apparently not shared
in the costs for facility cleanup.232 Navy has advised GAO that it will
likely fund the entire $43 million environmental cleanup at
Allegheny.13
3
H. PKJS Air Force GOCO, Jefferson County, Colorado
On February 28, 2001, GSA completed a negotiated sale of the
500-acre "PJKS Plant," a GOCO facility in Jefferson County,
Colorado, to the existing contractor (Lockheed Martin).2 34 The Air
Force GOCO is completely surrounded by 4,700 acres of property
225. See 1997 GAO Report, supra note 29, at 26. The GAO
investigated the cleanup of the Allegheny Ballistics Laboratory.
226. Ken Ward, Jr., Mineral Factory Site To Be Cleaned Up,
THE CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Jan. 14, 1998, available at 1998 WL
5927441.
227. See 1997 GAO Report, supra note 29, at 27.
228. Ward, supra note 226.
229. See 1997 GAO Report, supra note 29, at 26.
230. Id.
231. Ward, supra note 226.
232. See 1997 GAO Report, supra note 29, at 27.
233. Id. at 26-27.
234. Telephone Interview with Jerry Moore, General Services
Administration, Ft. Worth, TX Regional Office (Mar. 13, 2001).
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owned by the contractor. 3 ! In 1957, the Air Force purchased its 500
acres from the contractor. 236 According to GSA, the negotiated
purchase price for the GOCO facility was $3.68 million.37 In
addition, a separate environmental matters agreement was
negotiated, the product of binding arbitration between the
government and contractor to apportion environmental costs in
conjunction with the sale.238 The sale was complicated by adjoining
private and Air Force parcels.239 The contractor is obligated to pay
$3.5 million over ten years in environmental cleanup costs.24 ° Air
Force is obligated to pay the balance to complete the GOCO
cleanup, which is estimated to be $20 million.24'
CONCLUSION
In summary, a review of practices at other GOCO and non-GOCO
facilities reveals that, subject to annual appropriation limitations, the
federal government has historically appropriated the funding
necessary to accomplish GOCO facility cleanup.
Neither contractors nor municipalities have been 'held
involuntarily responsible for the cleanup of historical releases
attributable to DoD manufacturing activities at GOCO facilities. As
the military continues to divest itself of its former military bases and
industrial reserve plants, these assets present significant
opportunities for local economic redevelopment, job creation, and
increased tax revenue. CERCLA section 120(h) provides statutory
assurances of long-term, government environmental management.
During the last fifteen years of section 120(h)'s existence, these
statutory assurances have been effective and have not required
private enforcement. In fact, of the thousands of parcels of federal
235. See general information of "Plant PJKS" at website of
AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS CENTER, ACQUISITION ENVIRONMENTAL,
SAFETY AND HEALTH DIV., ENGINEERING DIRECTORATE, WRIGHT-
PATTERSON AFB, OHIO, at http://www.engineering.wpafb.af.mil/esh/
restoration/afppjks.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2001).
236. Id.
237. Telephone Interview with Jerry Moore, General Services
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property transferred by DoD and GSA for almost two decades, the
government has not failed to ultimately fulfill its section 120(h)
obligations. Nor have any lawsuits yet been filed by a nonfederal
transferee of contaminated federal property because of governmental
noncompliance with its statutory warranties.
No-cost GOCO conveyances are faithful to the objectives of
BRAC, have grown in popularity, and present minimal
environmental risk to the local municipalities and contractors.
Congress has authorized the divestiture of nine GOCO facilities for
no consideration during the last five years upon the request of
affected local communities. Strong local municipal interest in
obtaining a GOCO facility for redevelopment purposes is invariably
the ingredient that distinguishes successful no-cost GOCO
conveyances from less successful plant closures or higher-cost
negotiated sales of plants to third parties. By statute, contract, and
case law, the environmental liabilities arising from former DoD
manufacturing activities at GOCO facilities remain squarely with the
government.
